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Abstract: 
The objective of our study is to review and debate selected factors frequently underlined 
as the foundations to the strength and the resilient of economic growth in Indonesia in recent 
years. We first examine closely the compositions of the country’s exports to particularly 
highlight the role of primary commodities and diverse export destinations in cushioning the 
country’s balance of payment position. Next, our study assesses the country’s management of 
macroeconomic policies, especially the monetary and fiscal policies, and debates the overall 
effectiveness and limitations of these policy measures. Lastly, this paper explores the repentant 
stage of the country’s infrastructure, arguably a vital factor for the country’s ability to attract the 
much-needed domestic and foreign direct investment.  
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1. Introduction 
Having been among the most severely hit economy by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998, Indonesia, based on many measures, weathered the global slump of 2008-2009 remarkably 
well. The country maintained the third-highest gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the 
Group of Twenty economies (G-20) and the major Asia Pacific economies ---slower only to 
China and India, averaging higher than 4 percent quarterly during the first half of 2009 (Table 1). 
The country’s large domestic market and its relatively low dependency on external trade fueled 
the country’s economic growth amidst global economic recession. Robust growth in private 
consumption, underpinned by both moderate inflationary pressure and a surge in election-related 
spending, contributed close to 60 percent of GDP during the first half of 2009. Annualized 
headline inflation bottomed in July 2009 at around 2.7 percent from over 11 percent at the end of 
2008. However, with the return of rising commodity prices since the second half of 2009, 
especially with the crude oil price in the global market, a stronger inflationary pressure was 
registered in third quarter 2009.  
Following three consecutive quarters of current account deficits in 2008, the country 
reported a surplus in average of USD 3.0 billion during the first two quarters of 2009. The 
strength of the trade surplus mitigated the impacts of the deterioration of the capital and financial 
account, and improved the overall balance of payment position, contributing to the rise in the 
foreign exchange reserve from USD 51.6 billion at the end of 2008 to USD57.4 billion in July 
2009. The relative vigor of the Indonesian economy, and the success of parliamentary and 
presidential elections, particularly the successful reelection of President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono to his second term, brought about a healthy return of investor confidence. Between 
January and August 2009, the Indonesia stock-market index has gained 95% in the USD term, 
albeit still below its 2008 peak. Accordingly, the return of the capital inflow triggered an 
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appreciation trend in the local currency. Rupiah strengthened against most major currencies, in 
particularly against the US dollar. The Indonesian rupiah appreciated to around 1USD to Rp9400 
in early October 2009 from its weakest point at 1USD to Rp12200 in November 2008 (Figure 1).  
The objective of our study is to debate and review a number of factors frequently 
underlined as the foundations to the strength and resilient economic growth of the country in 
recent years. Next section examines closely the strength of the balance of payment of the 
country. In addition to the rapid return of portfolio investment, the role of the primary 
commodities and the diverse export destinations mitigated the impacts of the global financial 
crisis on the country’s balance of payment position. Section three assesses the country’s 
management of macroeconomic policies, especially the monetary and fiscal policies, and debates 
the overall effectiveness of these policy measures. Going forward, the country must rely less on 
its domestic consumption, and more on the investment, especially the direct investment. To 
attract future investment, both domestic and foreign, the country must first address the dire stage 
of its infrastructure bottlenecks. Section four of the paper explores the regretful stage of the 
country’s infrastructure. Brief concluding section ends the paper.   
 
2. Balance of Payment: Pleasant Surprise and Heightened Expectation 
Indonesia’s balance of payments situation has improved markedly, registering net 
surpluses for the first three quarters of 2009. This is a welcome contrast from the worrying 
trajectory experienced by the overall balance during the global turmoil, which accelerated in the 
second half of 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. From a net deficit of $4.2billion in 
the fourth quarter of 2008, the country’s external balance has improved to a quarterly average 
surplus of $2.9billion in 2009 (Figure 2). 
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Looking at the compositions of the country’s balance of payment, the current account 
balance has stayed at a comfortably positive level in 2009, adding stability to the overall external 
balance surplus for the country. Considering that the country had been running a current account 
deficit from the second to the fourth quarter of 2008, this development is especially heartening 
(Figure 3). While the relative stability in the level of worker remittances inflows and profit 
repatriations of foreign firms have helped to sustain the current account levels, the healthy 
overall surplus in recent quarters has been ultimately due to a strong performance in goods and 
services balance. Compared to the lackluster balance in the fourth quarter of 2008, which dipped 
below $1billion, the goods and services balance has been healthy this year, with an average of 
$4.8billion a quarter year-to-date. The latest number in the third quarter of 2009 at $4.6 billion 
adds to the confidence that trade balance will continue to be helpful to the country’s external 
payments conditions. 
A bottoming in exports coupled with a collapse in imports to give a favorable goods and 
services balance. The overall trade balance has stayed positive throughout this year, due in part 
to the fact that the country’s import bills for oil have come down dramatically alongside the drop 
in global oil prices (Figure 4). The prevalent gap between the recovery in exports and imports 
can be further explained by the fact that Indonesia is primarily a commodity-heavy raw materials 
exporter. Manufactured goods constitute only 16% of Indonesia’s total exports since 2006. In 
comparison, up to 53% and 44% of the total exports of Singapore and Malaysia respectively 
come from manufacturing of electronics alone. Therefore, unlike its neighbors which are more 
manufacturing-dependent and focus on the processing of imported intermediate goods for 
exports, Indonesia’s imports do not necessarily lead its export numbers (Figure 5). 
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In addition, the destinations of the Indonesian exports are relatively diverse. The big 
traditional export destinations such as the United States and the European markets, countries 
severely affected by the recent crisis, absorbed only around 25 percent of the Indonesian exports 
during the first three quarters of 2009. While the Southeast Asian neighbors consumed around 22 
percent of the country’s exports for the same period. In 2009, Indonesia has in fact exported 
more to China and India, than to the United States. A similar general picture can be drawn from 
the import number. Hence, the Indonesian trade sector arguably faced more of second-round 
effects of the recent global slowdowns.  
The improvement in Indonesia’s exports also appears to have been driven primarily by a 
recovery in commodity prices which are invariably linked to an improvement in demands from 
China (Figure 6). Once the stimulus package and monetary easing by the Chinese policymakers 
started to take hold, fixed asset investment in that country began to grow rapidly. The resurgence 
of investment there has in turn increased demand for raw materials, helping to boost trade 
balances of commodity-exporting countries like Indonesia and Australia. Whereas the current 
account’s successive deficits in H2 2008 contributed to a depletion of Bank Indonesia’s foreign 
exchange reserves and helped to foster perceptions of increasing country risks, its decisive swing 
into positive territory (and staying there) has done the exact opposite and stokes the current of 
optimism about Indonesia’s prospects. 
Domestically, the rounds of elections this year culminated in the re-election of market-
friendly President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono with an overwhelming direct mandate, as well as 
a strong showing for his Democrat Party in the earlier parliamentary elections. This has lent hope 
to the notion that the election results will enable his administration to have a stronger platform to 
undertake tough reforms that are essential for the country’s economy. Globally, the major central 
6 
 
banks managed to resuscitate the financial markets through a combination of rapid interest rate 
cuts as well as less-conventional quantitative easing measures. Banks started to lend to one 
another again, as they overcome the initial deep distrust of the creditworthiness of their counter-
parties. The keenly watched Libor-OIS spread, which at one point shot up to as high as 3.64% in 
mid-October last year, began to make its gradual decline. By late August this year, the measure 
has dipped below 0.25%, which according to Alan Greenspan, indicated that the willingness of 
banks to lend to one another has reached a ‘normal’ zone (Figure 7) (Fitzgerald (2009)). 
The return to a greater degree of normality in the global financial markets during the 
second half of 2009 has had a direct implication on the Indonesian economy. As markets 
switched from thinking about “returns of capital” back to the more normal assessment of “returns 
on capital”, money began to search for yields and started to return to Emerging Markets, 
including Indonesia. The country has gained additional visibility in this environment due in part 
to its status as being one of the few major Asian economies to have maintained positive growth 
throughout the post-Lehman global turmoil. This has invariably led to optimistic portrayal of the 
country’s prospects going forward, so much so that Moody’s, a ratings agency, decided to 
upgrade Indonesia’s ratings to Ba2 from Ba3 in September. By October, Standard & Poor’s, 
while keeping its BB- rating for the country, upgraded its outlook from “Stable” to “Positive” in 
what is widely viewed as a precursor to a ratings upgrade. 
Such optimism had played an important role in the dramatic shift in the country’s capital 
accounts balance, particularly on the portfolio investment front. Portfolio flows have swung from 
the $4.4 billion outflows during the global panic of the fourth quarter of 2008 into a decisive 
surplus of $1.9 billion by the first quarter of 2009. The inflows have continued to strengthen 
since, registering net surplus of $3.4billion in third quarter of 2009. The scale of capital inflows 
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has invariably contributed to a rally in the Indonesian stock market of late, enabling the index to 
be one of the best performing ones among Emerging Markets this year.  
The foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, however, have not been as ecstatic as 
portfolio investment. After the relative resilience throughout the tumultuous global events last 
year, the FDI inflows began to taper off this year, with a mere $0.4billion received in the third 
quarter of 2009. One likely explanation is that potential investors are adopting a wait-and-see 
attitude towards the new cabinet team and its general policy directions. However, as we would 
explore further at the latter stage of the paper, we believe that there is a number of nagging 
structural impediments, such as inadequate infrastructure, that has inhibited Indonesia from 
attracting substantial FDI inflows.  
 
3. Navigating Domestic Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Midst of Global Financial 
Crisis. 
It has now been well documented that the present global financial turmoil is confronting 
emerging market economies with two shocks, namely a sudden stop of capital inflows resulting 
from the global deleveraging process, and a collapse in export demand associated with the global 
recession (Ghosh, et.al. (2009)). To mitigate the impacts of the two externally originated shocks, 
the country’s management of macroeconomic policy responses, particularly those of monetary 
and fiscal measures, is crucial and has often been underlined as a detrimental factor in explaining 
the overall strength of the economy. This section would review key macroeconomic policy 
responses in Indonesia and generate lessons from them, in particular on the overall limitations of 
the macroeconomic policies during a global financial crisis.  
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3.1 Monetary Policy Side 
As in advanced economies, the basic thrust of the monetary policy in Indonesia is to ease 
the impacts of the deleveraging process in the global economy on the domestic liquidity. Like 
many central banks around the world, Bank Indonesia (BI) had embarked in massive 
expansionary monetary policy measures.  Its key policy rates declined from 9.5% in December 
2008 to 6.5% in August 2009, and the rate is expected to be kept for the rest of 2009. BI also 
took measures to ease pressure on the bank liquidity by cutting the reserve requirement for 
bank’s reserve at 5% from 9%. To help instill confidence in the domestic banking sector, the 
monetary authority raised the deposit guarantee limit from Rp100 million to Rp2 billion.  
Yet, despite the expansionary efforts, lending rate declined only moderately, especially 
compared to that of deposit rate. At the end of July 2009, the interbank rate in Indonesia stood at 
around 7%, among the highest in the region. It is worth noting that the rise in the gaps between 
the policy rate and key market rates has been a common feature of financial crisis.1 The policy 
rate, also known as the BI rate, was hovering around 8.5 percent in October 2008 and the spread 
rate between BI rate and the lending rate of the commercial banks was reported at around 5.4 
percent during the same period (Figure 8). In September 2009, Bank Indonesia had reduced its 
policy rate to around 6 percent to help stimulate the economy, yet the spread rate had actually 
inched up to over 7 percent. 
Market risk has often played a key role in explaining the widening gap between policy 
and market interest rates during the past financial crises (Taylor (2009)).  Reviewing the spread 
between the emerging market bond index (EMBI), capturing the expected cost of capital above 
the t-bill rate that a country must incur, Indonesia has indeed faced the most severe rise in the 
                                                            
1
 Similar episodes have also been reported in Indonesia during the 1997 financial crisis (Siregar 
(2005)). 
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cost of borrowing at the global market. The country’s EMBI rose above 800 point at fourth 
quarter of 2008, among the highest in the South-East Asian region (Table 2). The period of high 
EMBI was also coincided with the sharp weakening of the local currency against the US dollar 
(Figure 1). Yet, despite the return of market confidence and positive outlooks in the domestic 
economy, the EMBI at the third quarter of 2009 still doubled the index at the second quarter of 
2007.2 
The widening of the interest spreads between the policy rate and the key market rates 
could adversely affected ‘the optimal response of the policy rate’ to inflation, output gap and 
exchange rate volatilities. As market rates become less sensitive to the changes in the policy rate, 
we would be in a situation where it would take much steeper adjustments in interest rate to have 
any meaningful impacts in the market (Siregar and Goo (2009)). If the problem persists, situation 
worsens and/or no more room to adjust the policy rate (hitting the ‘zero’ floor of nominal rate), 
monetary policy may end up to be completely futile.3        
One key indicator, frequently found at the center of the debate on the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy in Indonesia, has been the growth of credits extended by the banking system in 
Indonesia.  Despite the expansionary monetary policy position, the lending growth declined 
significantly from the peak of close to 40% per annum recorded in October 2008 to less than 10 
percent by September 2009. Looking at the lending activities by the different groups of banks, 
only the state bank has been found to continuously sustain a high growth rate of credit at around 
18 percent year on year at the end of September 2009. In contrast, the private commercial banks 
                                                            
2
 In September 2009, the Moody rating agency has upgraded Indonesia’s foreign and local-
currency sovereign debt ratings to Ba2 from Ba3. 
3
 The ineffectiveness of the monetary policy during the recent crisis, as captured by the widening 
of the interest rate gaps, is also evident on the experiences of developed economies. Martin and 
Milas (2008) demonstrate the case of United Kingdom. 
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and the foreign banks recorded a dismal performance of around 4.5 percent and -5.4 percent in 
September 2009, respectively.    
 
3.2 Counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus  
The past episodes of sudden stops have demonstrated that countries with tighter fiscal 
policy experienced sharper contractions than those with a looser stance (Ortiz, et.al. (2009)). 
Particularly, given the limitation of the monetary policy discussed earlier, the role of the fiscal 
stimulus is critical, not only in terms of minimizing the impacts of the crisis, but more 
importantly in stimulating economic recovery.  Facing drastic changes in the amounts allocated 
for energy subsidies, a rise in the fund needed to cushion the impact of global financial crisis, 
and a potentially much slower economic growth, the government of Indonesia has resorted to 
Article 23 of Law 41/ 2008 to facilitate access to the parliamentary hearing on the 2009 budget 
in mid-January 2009. The Article 23 of Law 41/2008 stipulates that the government can return to 
parliament and proposes for budget revisions under three circumstances. First, economic growth 
is expected to fall more than below 1 percent of the assumed growth, and other key 
macroeconomic indicators deviate more than 10 percent from initially projections. Second, there 
is a sharp decline on the third-party liabilities of the banking system. Third, there is a drastic rise 
in the yields of the government bonds.    
The Minister of Finance unveiled a stimulus package for 2009, worth around Rp73.3 
trillion (or around US$ 6.4 billion), to boost the economy amid the threat of economic downturn. 
The package is broken down into three major categories, namely income tax cuts, waives of tax 
and import duties, and subsidies and government expenditure. Aiming to stimulus more spending 
by the household and corporate, around 60 percent of the Indonesian fiscal stimulus has been 
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allocated to cover cuts in income taxes. To minimize the effects of the global financial crisis, the 
government cuts individual income tax from 35% to 30% as well as corporate income tax from 
30% to 28%. Recognizing the high dependency of the local industries (both on tradable and non-
tradable sectors) on imports, as discussed earlier, around Rp2.5 trillion would finance waives of 
import duties for raw materials and capital goods. This is part of over Rp13 trillion package on 
tax and duties, about 18% of total stimulus package, to predominantly support businesses. To 
help reduce the operation cost of businesses, the stimulus package also cover diesel and 
electricity subsidy. Last but not least, close to Rp12.2 trillion will be allocated to support 
infrastructure and rural sector development.  
In view of the measures above, the government has committed to raise its fiscal deficit to 
2.5 percent of GDP in 2009. The flexibility of the Ministry of Finance to revise and to more than 
double the initial committed expansion highlights the successful effort by the country to reduce 
public debt and thus create the necessary fiscal space (Figure 9). At the end of 2000, the public 
debt level was reported to be close to 90 percent of the GDP. By September 2009, the country 
has seen its public debt level to drop to 30 percent of the GDP. Furthermore, the country’s 
revised target rate of budget deficit is well within the ranges of the expanded fiscal stimulus 
carried out by the neighboring Southeast Asian economies (Figure 9).  At the highest end, 
Malaysia has amended its stimulus package and aimed at around 4.8 percent budget deficit for 
2009. As one of the worst-hit economies by the recent global slowdown, Vietnam projected a 
budget deficit of around 3.5 percent in 2009. Facing limited fiscal space, Thailand had 
committed the most modest budget deficit at around 1.7 percent of GDP.     
However, critics have long been pointing out that the government of Indonesia has often 
underestimated tax revenue growth, while overestimating its ability to targeted projects. The 
12 
 
speed of government spending continued to be hampered by bureaucratic inefficiencies, and lack 
of institutional capacity, partly due to the devolution of power to provincial and district-level 
governments in recent years. At the end of 2008, the budget deficit was only of 0.1% of GDP, 
much lower than its 2.1% target. In November 2009 hearing before the XI Commission of the 
Parliament, the Minister of Finance reported that only less than 45% of the total stimulus 
package has been fully disbursed in the economy. On the expenditure stimulus, initially targeted 
around Rp12.2 trillion, the estimates show that only around 36% of the total amount has been 
fully absorbed by the local economy. The shortcoming is found in almost every key ministries 
and government agencies. For instance, the Ministry of Public Works has been allocated a 
stimulus package of around Rp.6 trillion, and yet only 44% has been implemented by end of 
third quarter of 2009. Similar trends are reported from the other key ministries, such as the 
ministry of energy and mining, the ministry of agriculture, and the ministry of trade. The most 
encouraging result was reported by the ministry of health, with over 75% of allocated package 
has been fully disbursed.   
Similarly, by July and December 2008, the regional government of the capital city, 
Jakarta, for instance, had managed to disburse only 17 and 64 percent of its annual budget, 
respectively (Basri and Siregar (2009)). Two factors were blamed for this: the late budget 
approval and the fears of improper disbursement following the Supreme Audit Agency’s 
discovery of irregularities in the 2007 budget. Despite some improvements in the submission of 
the approved local government budget for the last two years, we still see quite a few local 
government budgets (APBDs) were not approved until later in the year. Until end of January 
2009, only around two thirds of the total local governments, or 318 local governments, have 
reported the finalization of their 2009 budgets, and more than 192 local governments have not 
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reported the finalization of their budgets to the central governments (Gunawan and Siregar 
(2009)).  
The fiscal effort has however been benefited from the two elections, the parliamentary 
and the presidential, taken place in 2009. In their recent study, Resosudarmo and Yusuf (2009) 
highlight the stimulus consequence of the election-related spending of the government. It is 
estimated the total election budget for both parliamentary and presidential elections was around 
Rp47.9 trillion, of which about Rp18.6 trillion was included in the 2008 budget and Rp29.3 
trillion in the 2009 budget. It is estimated that the government spent about Rp50 trillion over a 
period of one year, compared to around Rp1000 trillion of total government expenditure in 2008. 
In the other words, financing election expenditure should have boosted government spending by 
around 5%. 
 
4. Dismal Stage of Infrastructure 
Going forward, the dismal stage of infrastructure must be addressed for the country to 
have any chance in achieving its potential economic growth. The latest Global Competitiveness 
Report (the World Economic Forum (2009)) listed the country’s inadequate supply of 
infrastructure as one of the investors’ top-most concerns on the prospects of doing business in 
Indonesia (Figure 10). The problem of deficiency in infrastructure is worsened by the fact that it 
is wide-ranging, encompassing different aspects of infrastructure provisions.  From roads to ports 
to electricity supply, investors surveyed by the World Economic Forum in its latest Global 
Competitiveness Report ranks Indonesia’s infrastructure quality at 96th out of the 133 countries. 
These findings demonstrate the dire state of the country’s infrastructure. In many ways, 
the current inadequacy of infrastructure facilities in the country stem from the long period of 
under-investment by the government in the decade or so after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. 
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According to a World Bank study4, public infrastructure investment before the crisis stood at 5-
6% of GDP. This figure fell dramatically in the years after the crisis, to about 1% of GDP in 
2000. Although infrastructure investment has picked up since then, to about 3.4% of GDP by 
2007, the amount of government spending on infrastructure is still significantly below the pre-
crisis levels.  
The minimal investment into road building, for instance, is unfortunately more of a norm 
than an exception. Between 1997 and 2006, the length of roads nationwide increased by a 
meager 15 percent, with 52,000 kilometers or so being added. In comparison, the number of 
vehicles nearly tripled over the same period, increasing by as much as 28.5 million vehicles. The 
pace of increase in the provision of road facilities simply could not match the needs of the 
economy at all (Figure 11) 
A similarly bleak picture can be witnessed in the electricity market. Between 2004 and 
2007, electricity supply increased by an average of 3.4% per annum. Over the same period, 
however, demand for electricity accelerated at double the pace of supply, increasing by 7.6% per 
annum on average (Figure 12). There is little wonder then that latent blackouts plague many 
parts of the country, and have even started to occur on Java Island, which has traditionally been 
better off in terms of infrastructure provisions. Even the capital city of Jakarta, the nation’s 
economic and political center, has to suffer rolling blackout during the second half of 2009, 
much to the disappointment of foreign factory owners who have to contend with production 
disruptions. 
All these deficiencies will make it that much harder for the country to attract and 
convince foreign investors to set up their factories and businesses. In an era where neighboring 
                                                            
4
 World Bank (2007). 
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countries are gearing up their efforts to capture the limited pool of foreign investments by 
offering a sophisticated set of incentive measures such as coordinated tax breaks and high-level 
infrastructure such as broadband connectivity, it is extremely unfortunate that Indonesia is 
struggling to even provide the very basic electricity and transportation needs. 
To be fair, the government has been active in at least initiating a number of programs in 
their attempt to alleviate the infrastructure problems. During his first term in office from 2004-
2009, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government had embarked on several initiatives 
to kick-start infrastructure development. In 2005, for example, the government announced plans 
to construct 1,000 kilometers of toll roads across the archipelago. A year later in 2006, the 
10,000 megawatt power crash program was launched in 2006 to meet the fast-growing demand 
for electricity. Some other key infrastructure projects that were initiated during this period 
include areas of public housing, water supply, and a particularly ambitious plan to install fiber-
optic networks in all of the country’s 33 provinces. 5 
Progress has been painfully slow, however. Only 10% of the 1,000-km toll road project 
has been completed to date. The 10,000-MW Power Crash program looks to fare slightly better 
by comparison. Even then, only a quarter of the targeted capacity has been completed thus far. 
The major stumbling blocks affecting the progress of such infrastructure projects remain land 
acquisition and cost recovery uncertainties. Land acquisition remains a major hurdle in road 
construction projects, particularly in the more densely populated Java Island. Acquisition of 
suitable land sites for projects are regularly hit with lengthy negotiations with residents, in part 
due to legal uncertainties on ownership of land.  
                                                            
5
 http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/10/27/afx7046555.html 
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Another major factor which has deterred would-be investors in infrastructure projects has 
been the lack of clarity on cost recovery after the projects are completed. Infrastructure projects 
require hefty initial investments that can only pay off in increments over extended periods of 
time after the completion of the projects. The pay-off for the investors comes in the form of 
electricity tariffs (in the case of power plant project) or tolls (in the case of toll road 
construction). These tend to be highly regulated by the government and are often subjected to 
politically-driven changes. As a whole, the situation adds to the degree of uncertainty and 
constitutes a deterrence factor for any potential investors. 
The president appears to understand such constraints well. Soon after assuming his 
second term in office, the buzzword for the new cabinet has been “de-bottlenecking”. The 
government, rightly, sees the need to remove a number of constraints that have prevented the 
economy from enjoying a more rapid growth. As a reflection of the priorities they give to these 
issues, the president has even set up a new office called the Presidential Delivery Unit that is 
headed by a well-respected technocrat, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. This office is singularly tasked 
with the removal of structural economic growth constraints, such as land acquisition mentioned 
earlier. 
At the end of the day, implementation remains the key.  Fruitful results cannot be 
accomplished by plans alone. The early signs may be promising. On the issue of land acquisition, 
for instance, the government is adding a new provision which would involve setting up a 
revolving fund to purchase land from the original owners, aiming to reduce risks for the 
investors. Foreign investors are watching the latest spurt of measures by the government closely, 
to see if the momentum of positive reforms can be sustained, and if the bottleneck of 
infrastructure inadequacy can indeed be removed. All eyes are on whether the president’s 
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second-term in office will yield more than the first one, in terms of improving the country’s 
overall investment climate and attracting more direct investments. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 The Sub-prime financial crisis has abruptly and severely slowed the economic growth of 
many countries in the world, including the emerging markets in Asia (Table 1).  It is therefore 
remarkable that the Indonesian economy has managed to continue growing and avoid balance of 
payment crisis of the 1997 East Asian crisis. The overall balance of payment in the country was 
in deficit only in the last quarter of 2008, driven predominantly by the sudden reversal of capital. 
In a sharp contrast, the country had to endure persistently fragile balance of payment position for 
full two years after the initial outbreak of the past East Asian financial crisis in the middle of 
1997 (Figure 13). In addition, the country’s relatively less reliance on trade and diverse trading 
partners contributed to the strength of the country’s current account balance. 
 As found in other economies in different corners of the globe, the experience of 
Indonesia during the recent global financial meltdown has also accentuated the country’s 
commitment to coordinated macroeconomic policies as a primary determinant of the robust 
economic growth. However our study has shown that the effectiveness of both monetary and 
fiscal policies has largely been hampered by a number of limitations. Further studies, therefore, 
are warranted to examine how much the country’s robust economic growth during the recent 
crisis has indeed been due to good policies.  
 Following the announcement of their election, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) and his vice president, Boediono, promptly announced a set of soci-economic targets, 
including an annual growth rate of 7 percent by 2014 (the end of SBY’s second term) and 
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unemployment at around 5-6 percent (Resosudarmo and Yusuf (2009)). It is clear however that 
the country must address its dire stage of infrastructure, if it were to have any real chance to 
achieve the set of targets outlined by the current government. 
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Table 1: Growth Performance of Selected Countries 
  2009 GDP Growth Projection 
Country Initial  Revised 
Malaysia 4.8 0.2 
Thailand 4.5 2 
Australia 2.2 1.7 
Indonesia*  6 4.5 
USA 0.1 -0.8 
UK -0.1 -1.3 
Singapore 3.5 -5 
Japan 0.5 -0.2 
South Korea 3.5 2.5 
India 6.9 6 
China 9.3 8 
 
Source: CEIC Database 
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Table 2: Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) 
 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Vietnam China 
      
Q1-2007 186 72 180 122 53 
      
Q2-2007 144 71 138 101 52 
      
Q3-2007 234 109 204 178 87 
      
Q4-2007 271 120 208 203 121 
      
Q1-2008 321 143 272 278 152 
      
Q2-2008 338 141 244 366 132 
      
Q3-2008 398 172 293 389 174 
      
Q4-2008 837 396 566 797 230 
      
Q1-2009 788 350 452 657 178 
      
Q2-2009 419 179 301 353 87 
      
Q3-2009 309 178 271 330 98 
 
Source: CEIC Asia-Database 
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Figure1: Bilateral Nominal Exchange Rate against the US dollar 
(Monthly average and January 2005=100) 
 
Source: The University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business, Pacific Exchange Rate 
Service Database (http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html) 
 
Figure 2: Balance of Payments 
 
Source: CEIC Asia-Database 
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Figure 3: Current Accounts 
 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database 
Figure 4: Oil Import Bills and Global Oil Price 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database 
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Figure 5: Trade Balance 
 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database 
 
Figure 6: Export Drivers 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database 
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Figure 7: Libor-OIS Spread 
 
 Source: Bloomberg. 
Figure8: BI Rate and Lending Rate 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database 
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Figure 9: Budget Deficit (in % of GDP) for 2009 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg, CEIC Asia Database 
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Figure10:  Investors’ Concerns about Doing Business in Indonesia 
 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2009, World Economic Forum.  
Figure11: Road transport infrastructure 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database.  
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Figure 12: Electricity 
 
Source: CEIC Asia Database. 
Figure 13: Balance of Payment Position during the 1997 East Asian Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Source: CEIC Asia database. 
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